On 29 April 2025, the European Parliament hosted a high-level security conference titled "The Russian-Iranian Alignment and its Threat to European Interests," which I co-organised alongside the European Leadership Network (ELNET). The event brought together over dozens of Members of the European Parliament, officials from NATO, the European Commission, and representatives from several national Permanent Representations and embassies, with well over a thousand viewers following the debate online, a clear indication of the rising concern across Europe over the evolving threat dynamics posed by the tightening strategic partnership between Russia and Iran.
What emerged from this timely debate is that Russia and Iran no longer represent two parallel challenges. Rather, they now function as nodes in a unified axis, operating in coordination across multiple domains. Their cooperation extends from the battlefield to cyberspace, from sanctions evasion to disinformation, and from proxy warfare to nuclear brinkmanship. The result is a fusion of interests that directly threatens European security, democratic resilience, and the cohesion of NATO and the European Union.
Iran has supplied Russia with thousands of Shahed drones, which have enabled Moscow to strike deep into Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure. In exchange, Russia has provided Tehran with advanced weaponry, access to battlefield intelligence, and, perhaps most critically, sensitive Western technologies captured in Ukraine. These exchanges have not only enhanced Iran’s military capabilities but have also created feedback loops that accelerate both sides’ capacity for asymmetric warfare. The tactical convergence is now reinforcing an ideological one: both regimes embrace narratives of civilisational confrontation with the West. Both view the current global order as inherently hostile to their existence and see its destabilisation as a strategic imperative.
Europe has responded to these developments with a growing suite of defensive measures. Investment in critical infrastructure protection, increased defence spending, and improved cyber resilience have all helped to enhance our capacity for deterrence by denial. But while these steps are necessary, they are not sufficient. Deterrence by denial aims to prevent an adversary from achieving its goals by making attacks more difficult or less effective. Yet this approach alone does not convince aggressive actors to change their behaviour. It merely challenges their tactics. It is deterrence by punishment—the threat of meaningful, credible retaliation—that changes an adversary's calculus entirely.
At present, Europe lacks a coherent and operationalised concept of deterrence by punishment. While sanctions have become a central tool in our foreign policy arsenal, they are often slow, reactive, and riddled with exemptions. Moreover, they are frequently perceived as cost-manageable by adversaries who have become adept at sanctions evasion through parallel economies and third-country facilitators. The result is that sanctions, while symbolically important, rarely serve as a true deterrent.
To establish a credible deterrence posture, Europe must be prepared to impose costs in a timely, direct, and proportionate manner. This means developing the political will and operational capacity to respond to hybrid attacks in real time. If critical infrastructure is sabotaged, our response should not be confined to repairs and statements of condemnation. It must include countermeasures that degrade the aggressor’s capabilities or expose them to risk in a domain they cannot ignore. If satellite communications are disrupted, cyberattacks initiated, or undersea cables targeted, then a purely defensive stance effectively invites repetition. Retaliation must be part of the vocabulary of deterrence.
Such a posture does not entail recklessness or escalation. On the contrary, it restores strategic balance. Deterrence by punishment is not about revenge; it is about reinforcing norms, drawing red lines, and denying aggressors the assumption that they can act without consequence. It is about ensuring that our adversaries understand not only what we are defending, but how far we are willing to go to defend it. At present, the gap between our declaratory policy and our operational readiness continues to grow. This disparity invites probing actions and calibrated aggression.
Strategic coherence also requires that Europe abandon its overreliance on distant timelines. The oft-repeated goal of "being ready by 2030" is disconnected from the tempo of adversarial action. Russia and Iran are not planning for the end of the decade. They are shaping facts on the ground today. Their use of hybrid tactics is calibrated for ambiguity, speed, and plausible deniability. Our response mechanisms must be equally agile. That includes pre-authorised response protocols, forward-deployed capabilities, and cross-border coordination that is politically authorised and technically executable on short notice.
Moreover, Europe must treat Ukraine and Israel not only as partners but as frontline laboratories of modern warfare. These states are innovating in drone tactics, electronic warfare, civil-military integration, and societal resilience under conditions of sustained threat. Their lessons are directly applicable to European defence planning. Yet too often, Europe positions itself as the distant benefactor of these countries rather than a strategic co-learner. This must change.
If deterrence is to be more than a slogan, it must be built into the logic of our institutions, the posture of our forces, and the psychology of our adversaries. It must include the willingness to act pre-emptively against emerging threats, the credibility to follow through, and the institutional clarity to ensure such actions are lawful and legitimate.
Ultimately, Europe’s ability to deter aggression from a Russia-Iran axis will rest not just on our capacity, but on our cohesion, credibility, and clarity of purpose. Authoritarian regimes thrive on ambiguity, divisions, and the perception that democracies are too divided or hesitant to act. Reversing this perception requires more than declarations. It requires the practical integration of deterrence by punishment into our strategic posture.
Europe has the resources. It has the alliances. It has the legal and moral authority. What remains is to translate this potential into a posture that is not only resilient, but assertive—a posture that leaves no doubt in the minds of adversaries that the costs of aggression will always outweigh the gains.
