Shifting the EU from its self-regard and focusing on NATO and the Russian threat to European security 

With war raging in Eastern Europe, eight parliamentary elections will be held across Europe in 2024. The most consequential will be the British General Election on 4 July and the European Parliament elections culminating on 9 June. On 5 November there is the US Presidential Election. How will the outcome of the most significant elections affect the security of our citizens across Europe?

The most immediate, active threat to European security is Russia’s unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine. Britain has led the way in Europe in support for Ukraine and rearmament in the face of the most serious aggression in Europe since the Second World War. Germany is the leading EU country in its support, sending air defence systems, tanks, drones and artillery shells. United States assistance is totalling  $175 billion.

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, a European sovereign state, has shaken the assumptions on which so much of the defence policy of the democracies had been based for the 30 years since the end of the Cold War.

Putin’s fabricated excuses for the invasion – “de-nazification” and the protection of Russian citizens – can be easily dismissed. His real motives have been brewing since the collapse of the Soviet Union and are revealed in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept which he approved in March 2023.  He seeks recognition of Russia, as a unique country-civilization, Russkiy mir, a nuclear-armed Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power, with an extensive sphere of influence, particularly in the culturally orthodox lands. Simply put, he wants incorporation of Ukraine into Russia, a seat at the top table as a global superpower, an end to sanctions, and a West-free buffer zone around the borders of Russia and its vassal partners. In other words, a new iron curtain.

The Russian Operational Group of Forces in the occupied territories of Ukraine comprise some 470,000 troops, 2,000 tanks and 5,000 artillery pieces. This is on a par with the Group of Soviet Forces that were based in East Germany, primed to attack Western Europe, at the height of the Cold War. To deter that very real threat, throughout the period 1952-1993, NATO positioned military forces across central Europe. Hundreds of thousands of American, British and other allied troops were deployed forward in Germany, with some 20 divisions (each typically comprising two or three brigades) capable of massive reinforcement and backed by overwhelming air power, to deter invasion. This shows the scale of the challenge.

As the conflict in Ukraine has increased, NATO has gradually developed a new force structure to defend Eastern Europe. Each of the eight most vulnerable NATO allies now hosts external NATO forces, each building up to brigade size (about 5,000 troops) , including Americans, British and Canadians alongside their continental European allies. The new NATO Force Model aims to ensure that 300,000 troops are at high readiness.  This shows Russia that NATO is deadly serious about defending the European democracies, and is a practical demonstration of transatlantic solidarity with American and Canadian troops on the ground alongside their European allies.

Moscow’s strategy is two-fold. Firstly to frighten Western public opinion into appeasing Russia in order to avoid conflict. Secondly, to separate Europe from the United States – to break the transatlantic alliance that has been our saviour and protection for over 80 years. The idea of the EU as a “third force” on the international stage plays directly into the Kremlin script for splitting the Atlantic Alliance.

We are constantly being told that America is turning its back on Europe, pivoting to Asia, and that Donald Trump wants to take America out of NATO. Nothing could be further from the truth. Every American president since Eisenhower has wanted the Europeans to contribute more to their own security. Trump just speaks in more brash language. The fact is, he has been a major incentive for the Europeans to do more – two-thirds of NATO’s 32 members now spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence. Ten years ago, only three NATO allies met that meagre target. Front-line Poland’s previous Law & Justice government showed its resolve by increasing defence spending to 3.9% of GDP, the highest proportion among all NATO members, with plans to increase its military to 300,000 personnel — up from 186,000 now — and procure new tanks, missiles, air defence systems and aircraft. 

The United States has more troops and equipment stationed in Europe than since the end of the Cold War. It is investing some $5 billion in the European Deterrence Initiative and on 23 April the US Congress approved a further $60 billion defence assistance programme for Ukraine. This is a massive, continuing, and reliable commitment to European security by the United States. And it’s what Russia fears most.

EU Defence Policy, with its emphasis on EU “strategic autonomy”, is not only divisive (EU v. USA) and discriminatory (UK, Norway and Turkey, for instance, are key European NATO allies who are not in the EU) but also dangerous. The primary strategic aim of the European democracies should be to ensure that the United States remains committed to their security through the well-tested NATO alliance, not by setting up alternative, exclusive structures.

In November 2023 the European parliament voted to establish a Defence Union with military units under EU operational command and extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) decision-making to areas of foreign and defence policy that are currently matters for national governments. This is not yet EU policy but signals the direction of travel with EU Commission officials working up firm policy proposals using the European parliament to test the water.

EU defence policies, including its numerous and much-vaunted military missions, contribute little that is militarily useful. They are artificially created and do not bear scrutiny. Their aim is to widen EU involvement into another vital area of policy and accelerate the process of political integration.  Not only is this undesirable in itself but  the EU just adds bureaucratic interference, complication,  and duplication. Movement of NATO forces and reinforcements across Europe, for example, was previously a relatively simple matter for NATO allies before the EU got involved.  NATO has long had a Standardization Agency to ensure that weapons and systems are interoperable across the alliance and in response to Ukraine’s needs has introduced a procurement programme for 155mm shells worth over billion dollars. Now the EU wants to create its own system. Most spending on defence equipment in Europe is by five countries, which, over the decades, have created successful consortia for collaborative projects. There is no evidence of the need for involvement of the EU institutions.

Seeing itself as Europe’s leading military power, Britain usually took the view that it could restrain EU ambitions so that they did not upset the US or collide with NATO. The arrival of Labour in government in 1997 under Tony Blair saw the UK actually encouraging EU Defence, naively thinking this was a way of enhancing British influence. Britain is no longer an EU member but Labour spokesmen are suggesting that they would again seek to ingratiate themselves with the EU with a formal Defence & Security Pact if they were to win the forthcoming UK General Election. 

The arbiter of EU defence policy is of course France. So any deals would have to pass the French test which by definition means that Britain would have to pay and be put at a disadvantage. This applies particularly to defence procurement and research projects.

Membership of NATO and the EU are almost the same – 23 countries belong to both organisations. So why is the EU so keen to develop its own defence structures? For all the trumpeting of EU defence policy, when the going started to get tough, even long-standing ‘neutral’ Finland and Sweden decided that the EU wasn’t likely to defend them and they’d better join NATO. Even the French - during their particularly petulant period from 1966-2009 - left the formal military structure of NATO but never left the alliance as a whole. They even kept a seat on its Military Committee.

We can see all the disadvantages of an autonomous EU Defence. Its advocates talk of its necessity if the US were to lose interest in NATO. But nothing is more likely to encourage the Americans to leave than if they thought the Europeans were not pulling their weight and  planning to do without them.

It makes sense for British government of whatever complexion to continue strengthening bi-lateral relationships with continental European countries, and sometimes even with the EU itself, over a range of polices, including aspects of security such as people-trafficking and counter-terrorism. But it should do nothing to encourage the EU’s politically-driven military ambitions where involvement would inevitably be to Britain’s cost and distract from the priority of NATO.

As there is only one political group in the European parliament, the European Conservatives & Reformists (ECR), that includes in its founding principles the revitalisation of NATO, the likely expansion of that group after the forthcoming elections will be an opportunity to strengthen the resolve and effectiveness of the West in deterring Putin and send a positive message to the United States.