Over the last month, large scale protests have broken out in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. The demonstrations, for the most part dominated by students and young professionals, are against a move by the government to curtail the ability for civil society organisations to operate within the country.
The new legislation will see non-governmental organisations receiving international funding in Georgia forced to register as ‘Foreign Agents’ – a loaded term from the Soviet period to euphemistically describe a person or entity as a spy. This new legislation will in effect curtail the ability for civil society groups to organise within the country. The legislation is an almost word for word copy of similar legislation enacted in Russia in 2012 – before numerous pro-democracy groups were forced to shut.
Whilst this may seem like an innocuous law to protest over, the reality is that it represents the most recent attempt by the ruling Georgian Dream party to cement their hold on power. The organisations that would be most affected by this legislation are those that promote Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration and support a move towards the West. That would also include groups that receive EU funding, and financing from foreign governments to this end.
The Georgian Dream party on the other hand is decidedly pro-Russian – least of all because the financial interests of its oligarchic leader Bidzina Ivanishvili lie in Russia.
Indeed, the passage of the ‘Foreign Agents’ law in Georgia would follows a trend of democratic backsliding within the country that has taken place over the last decade. It follows the systematic takeover of state assets by figures linked to the government, violent clamp downs on peaceful protestors, and physical assaults on opposition politicians. The case that however has attracted the most attention is that of former President Mikheil Saakashvili – who has languished in prison for more than two years in poor health over trumped up charges of corruption.
Since the passage of the law on the 14th of May, police have taken increasingly violent measures against protestors, opposition politicians, and even in one case a printing company that provided posters for the campaign. In all, it represents a dangerous deterioration of the country’s democracy.
Whilst the case of democratic backsliding in Georgia is indeed of concern on its own, taken in the wider context of the region it sits in, it should be attracting far more concern from the West. Georgia, sitting in the heart of the South Caucasus between the Black Sea, Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, is an important geopolitical fulcrum.
A pro-western Georgia acts as a bridge country to not just the rest of the Caucasus, but also to Central Asia. Indeed, the EU’s recent approach to signing energy and transport agreements with Azerbaijan and Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hinge on access to the Port of Batumi in Georgia.
The proposed ‘Middle Corridor’, that would see Caspian oil and natural gas supplied to Europe from Azerbaijan, through Georgia, and either across the Black Sea to Romania or through Turkey to the Balkans, has been touted as a chance to break dependence on Russian energy.
Not only would it support the energy independence, through diversification of sources, in Europe – but it would also provide a chance for countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus to break their own trade dependency on Russia, China, and Iran.
Equally, the same route provides a valuable alternative for opening trade with Asia, avoiding what are becoming unreliable sea routes through the Bab-El-Mandeb straits as a result of Houthi attacks on merchant vessels. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railways, opened in 2017, has the potential to become a vital infrastructure link for freight between East and West. A more aggressive and openly pro-Russian government could see such a line disrupted and used instead for the pushing of another agenda.
Indeed, this is already evident in the way in which the Georgian Dream government has approached China as a potential partner. China has already committed to a great deal of investment inside of Georgia – especially in the Black Sea port city of Batumi. It is obvious that China is interested in integrating a subdued Georgia into the Belt and Road Initiative.
A democratic Georgia with closer ties to the West falls well outside of China’s interests when it comes to expanding its own trade empire. Instead, a Georgia isolated from the West would mean that it can cultivate the country as another destination for cheaply manufactured goods along the route.
In effect, Georgia is at risk of becoming a new playing field in a renewed ‘Great Game’ for control of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Its position as a bridging nation between East and West, so close to what could be considered the soft underbelly of Russia, China, and Iran, means that it is in the Wests interest to prevent it from slipping away.
Losing Georgia wouldn’t just be the destruction of the country’s Euro-Atlantic dream, cultivated since its restored independence in the 1990s and built upon in the aftermath of Russia’s bloody invasion in 2008, but it would also mean the breaking of a key anchoring point for further productive western engagement with Azerbaijan and Central Asia.
One point of strength that the European Union has cultivated in the last three decades since the collapse of communism, is its so called ‘normative’ power. That is to say that the promise of trade, cooperation, and even membership of the European Union, has been a driving force for positive democratic and regulatory change within countries in its immediate neighbourhood.
This normative power has helped to carry many countries in Europe out of Russia’s orbit and into the West. In particular it was instrumental in aiding the transition of post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe into vibrant market based liberal democracies.
Another point to consider in the loss of Georgia into Russia’s orbit would be the message that it sends the rest of the region when it comes to European Union policy. Armenia, a country that had historically close ties to Russia, has gradually been shifting its orbit towards the West – in part because Georgia’s own Euro-Atlantic aspirations open the prospect of Armenia as a future candidate for the EU and NATO.
Armenia, a country that has been under increased pressure from both Russia and its neighbours, has sought to deepen ties with the West, and even opened the prospect of joining the European Union. Yet due to its geographic and political isolation, it would be impossible to imagine Armenia within the EU unless Georgia had already joined.
Further to that, Tbilisi has long provided a stable base for Western pro-democracy NGOs to operate in the wider region. Specialist organisations countering Russian disinformation have been based out of Georgia in support of Armenia. Without these NGOs, Armenia could become a new hotbed of Russian influence and disinformation. Just in the last few weeks, anti-government protests have erupted in border areas and rural towns in Armenia, partly fuelled by Russian disinformation.
A wider issue also remains, that should Georgia be knocked off its path towards EU membership, confidence in the accession process itself could be broken. It has already been more than a decade since the last new Member State joined the European Union, and since then the United Kingdom (a historic supporter of EU enlargement) has left. Georgia was once seen as a role model for candidate countries, by backsliding and falling out of the process, the EU could well break trust in the system itself.
With all of this said and done, there is one burning question that needs to be answered – how has this situation been allowed to come about? Where has the West been as Georgia has backslid?
The answer is simple, complacency. For many in Brussels, London, Washington, and beyond – Georgia was viewed as a settled issue. After the 2008 invasion by Russia, the West poured resources into supporting the development of the country – training its army, providing support for regulatory reform, creating programmes to support the development of democracy. Had experts in foreign ministries or the European Commission been asked to guess which country was most on course to join the EU and NATO next, they might have picked Georgia.
However, the situation in the country drastically changed after 2012. The pro-Western United National Movement of Mikheil Saakashvili lost the election to Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream party.
Ivanishvili, an oligarch whose wealth was acquired in Russia thanks to his close ties to the Kremlin, set about changing the direction of the country. At first presenting himself as an ally of the West and in favour of EU integration. However, very quickly it became clear that this was little more than window dressing. Within a year the prison population had swelled, and opponents had been locked up. Ivanishvili pushed for the thawing of relations with Russia, lifting embargos that had been in place since the 2008 invasion.
The problem remains, that the West has continued to act as though nothing has changed in recent years. The Wests attitude towards Georgia is symptomatic of a worrying trend towards foreign policy on autopilot. That is to say that thanks to its increased bureaucratisation, the West is no longer active in values promotion, but has instead become slow and reactive. The EU and other Western Countries continue to spend money on Georgian Government projects, despite evidence of corruption.
In 2023, it was found that the Georgian governments own ‘Strategic Communications’ channels were being used to spread pro-Russian disinformation and to attack the opposition [1] [2] [3]. The so called ‘StratCom’ had received extensive EU funding, as well as financing from the governments of the UK and USA. Rather than targeting disinformation, the government has chosen to amplify it, using Western funding.
Indeed, even the attitude of the Georgian government towards diplomatic engagements with Western leaders has sharpened. In recent months the Prime Minister and Speaker of the Parliament have lashed out at politicians in Europe and the United States, using undiplomatic language and accusing them of trying to trigger a revolution inside the country. According to the United States Department of State, the leadership of Georgia also refused to engage in high level dialogues with the American administration.
This fits a wider pattern of erratic, anti-western, behaviour by the Georgian Dream government. Perhaps the most notable example is the continued resistance of the government to provide support to Ukraine in its defence against Russia’s invasion. Spurred by an alleged ‘fear’ that Russia might retaliate against Georgia directly, the government has thus far not sent assistance to Kyiv.
However, perhaps more concerningly, Georgia has become a hot bed of sanctions dodging. Despite sanctions elsewhere in Europe, direct flights between Georgia and Russia have continued. Western goods travel through Georgia to Russia. And Georgian banks are used as a stopping off point for the transfer of money from the West to Russia. In 2023, the Georgian National Bank recorded more than $2bn worth of transactions [4].
The fact is that the West negligence is as much to blame for the situation it finds itself in today as anything else. The failure to catch Georgia’s democratic backsliding, and shift towards Russia, sooner has put its whole influence in the West at risk. Not only that, but the collapse of civil society organisations as the result of this shift could mean that Georgia is permanently drawn into Russia and China’s orbit against the will of the majority of its people.
As such the West needs to take stronger action when it comes to defending democracy in the country. In the first instance, withholding financial support to the Georgian government could prove an effective tool. However, it risks giving the Georgian Dream Party another stick with which to beat the West, claiming foreign interference.
Equally, the nuclear option would be to withdraw Georgia’s candidate status of the European Union. However, this again would play firmly into the hands of pro-Russian elements inside the government. It could be used to claim that the EU is directly interfering in Georgia’s internal politics.
Instead, the focus should be on providing both a carrot and stick approach. The stick should be the threat of direct sanctions against prominent figures of the Georgian Dream government. In the first instance, Ivanishvili should be a target of both financial and travel sanctions. Followed by Members of Parliament who voted for the law should be the next to face sanctions.
The carrot on the other hand is obvious, further support for a country that finds itself under increased pressure as a result of its geopolitical situation. With both Russia and China investing political and financial capital in the country, the West needs to catch up by offering tangible proof that the country stands to gain more from its Euro-Atlantic future.
Integrating the port of Batumi into EU mobility funding, providing direct investment in upgrading facilities and making it a key route for the EU. Or perhaps by going through with proposed plans to connect Georgia up to the European energy grid through undersea cables. Greater Erasmus+ and Horizon funding to make Georgia into a regional academic hub.
The passage of the ‘Foreign Agents Law’ in Georgia represents a significant setback for both democracy in Georgia, and for hopes of steering the rest of the Caucasus towards the West. In a region that has so often been overlooked by policy makers in Europe and America, it is high time to put together a coherent strategy that puts both regional, and geopolitical interests at the forefront.
A free and democratic Georgia is an important bridge for relations with the Caucasus, and Central Asia beyond it. At a time of geopolitical uncertainty, the West should not waste an opportunity to build such new alliances.
[1] https://civil.ge/archives/546905
[4] https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-2-billion-russian-bank-transfers/32227284.html
